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Abstract
Alice seeks an information-theoretically secure source of private random data. Un-
fortunately, she lacks a personal source and must use remote sources controlled by other
parties. Alice wants to simulate a coin flip of specified bias α, as a function of data she
receives from p sources; she seeks privacy from any coalition of r of them. We show: If
p/2 ≤ r < p, the bias can be any rational number and nothing else; if 0 < r < p/2, the
bias can be any algebraic number and nothing else. The proof uses projective varieties,
convex geometry, and the probabilistic method. Our results improve on those laid out
by Yao, who asserts one direction of the r = 1 case in his seminal paper [Yao82]. We
also provide an application to secure multiparty computation.
1 Introduction
Alice has a perfectly fair penny—one that lands heads exactly 50% of the time. Unfortu-
nately, the penny is mixed in with a jar of ordinary, imperfect pennies. The truly fair penny
can never be distinguished from the other pennies, since no amount of experimentation can
identify it with certainty. Still, Alice has discovered a workable solution. Whenever she
needs a fair coin flip, she flips all the pennies and counts the Lincolns; an even number
means heads, and an odd number means tails.
Alice’s technique is an example of “robust coin flipping.” She samples many random
sources, some specified number of which are unreliable, and still manages to simulate a
desired coin flip. Indeed, Alice’s technique works even if the unreliable coin flips somehow
fail to be independent.
Bob faces a sort of converse problem. He’s marooned on an island, and the nearest
coin is over three hundred miles away. Whenever he needs a fair coin flip, he calls up
two trustworthy friends who don’t know each other, asking for random equivalence classes
∗It is our pleasure to thank Tom Church, for helping simplify our original proof of algebraicity of mystery-
values; La´szlo´ Babai, for providing guidance with respect to publication; La´szlo´ Csirmaz, for discussing
secret-sharing with us; Victor Protsak, for pointing us to Lind’s article [Lin84]; and Matthew Woolf, Nic
Ford, Vipul Naik, and Steven J. Miller for reading drafts and providing helpful comments. We are also
grateful to several anonymous referees for their suggestions.
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modulo two. Since the sum of the classes is completely mysterious to either of the friends,
Bob may safely use the sum to make private decisions.
Bob’s technique seems similar to Alice’s, and indeed we shall see that the two predica-
ments are essentially the same. We shall also see that the story for biased coin flips is much
more complex.
1.1 Preliminaries and Definitions
Informally, we think of a random source as a (possibly remote) machine capable of sampling
from certain probability spaces. Formally, a random source is a collection C of probability
spaces that is closed under quotients. That is, if X ∈ C and there is a measure-preserving
map1 X → Y , then Y ∈ C. Random sources are partially ordered by inclusion: We say
that C is stronger than D iff C ⊃ D.
The quotients of a probability space X are precisely the spaces a person can model with
X. For example, one can model a fair coin with a fair die: Label three of the die’s faces
“heads” and the other three “tails.” Similarly, one can model the uniform rectangle [0, 1]2
with the uniform interval [0, 1]: Take a decimal expansion of each point in [0, 1], and build
two new decimals, one from the odd-numbered digits and one from the even-numbered
digits.2 Thus, forcing C to be closed under quotients is not a real restriction; it allows us
to capture the notion that “a fair die is more powerful that a fair coin.”3
We define an infinite random source to be one that contains an infinite space.4 A
finite random source, on the other hand, contains only finite probability spaces. Further,
for any set of numbers S, we define an S-random source to be one which is forced to take
probabilities in S. That is, all the measurable sets in its probability spaces have measures
in S.
Sometimes we will find it useful to talk about the strongest random source in some
collection of sources. We call such a random source full-strength for that collection. For
instance, a full-strength finite random source can model any finite probability space, and a
full-strength S-random source can model any S-random source.
In practice, when p people simulate a private random source for someone else, they
may want to make sure that privacy is preserved even if a few people blab about the
data from their random sources or try to game the system. Define an r-robust function
of p independent random variables to be one whose distribution does not change when
the joint distribution of any r of the random variables is altered. Saying that p people
simulate a random source r-robustly is equivalent to asserting that the privacy of that
source is preserved unless someone learns the data of more than r participants. Similarly,
to simulate a random source using p sources, at least q of which are working properly, Alice
must run a (p− q)-robust simulation.
By a robust function or simulation, we mean a 1-robust one.
1A measure-preserving map (morphism in the category of probability spaces) is a function for which the
inverse image of every measurable set is measurable and has the same measure. Any measure-preserving
map may be thought of as a quotient “up to measure zero.”
2In fact, this defines an isomorphism of probability spaces between the rectangle and the interval.
3It would also be natural (albeit unnecessary) to require that C is closed under finite products.
4An infinite space is one that is not isomorphic to any finite space. A space with exactly 2012 measurable
sets will always be isomorphic to a finite space, no matter how large it is as a set.
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We use J to denote the all-ones tensor of appropriate dimensions. When we apply J to
a vector or hypermatrix, we always mean “add up the entries.”
1.2 Results
This paper answers the question “When can a function sampling from p independent ran-
dom sources be protected against miscalibration or dependency among p − q of them?”
(Alice’s predicament), or equivalently, “When can p people with random sources simulate
a private random source for someone else5 in a way that protects against gossip among any
p− q of them?” (Bob’s predicament). In the first question, we assume that at least q of the
sources are still functioning correctly, but we don’t know which. In the second question,
we assume that at least q of the people keep their mouths shut, but we don’t know who.
In the terminology just introduced, we seek a (p− q)-robust simulation.
Consider the case of p full-strength finite random sources. We prove: If 1 ≤ q ≤ p/2, the
people may simulate any finite Q-random source and nothing better; if p/2 < q < p, they
may simulate any finite Q-random source and nothing better. The proof uses projective
varieties, convex geometry, and the probabilistic method. We also deal briefly with the case
of infinite random sources, in which full-strength simulation is possible, indeed easy (see
Appendix C).
1.3 Yao’s robust coin flipping
Our work fits in the context of secure multiparty computation, a field with roots in A. C.
Yao’s influential paper [Yao82]. In the last section of his paper, entitled “What cannot be
done?”, Yao presents (a claim equivalent to) the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (A. C. Yao). Alice has several finite random sources, and she wants to generate
a random bit with bias α. Unfortunately, she knows that one of them may be miscalibrated,
and she doesn’t know which one. This annoyance actually makes her task impossible if α
is a transcendental number.
It does not not suffice for Alice to just program the distribution (α 1− α) into one of the
random sources and record the result; this fails because she might use the miscalibrated
one! We require—as in our jar of pennies example—that Alice’s algorithm be robust enough
to handle unpredictable results from any single source.
Unfortunately, Yao provides no proof of the theorem, and we are not aware of any in
the literature. Yao’s theorem is a special case of the results we described in the previous
section.
2 Simulating finite random sources
The following result is classical.
5Later, we give an application to secure multiparty computation in which the output of the simulated
random source has no single recipient, but is utilized by the group without any individual gaining access;
see Section 3.
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Proposition 2. If p players are equipped with private d-sided dice, they may (p−1)-robustly
simulate a d-sided die.
Proof. We provide a direct construction. Fix a group G of order d (such as the cyclic group
Z/dZ). The ith player uses the uniform measure to pick gi ∈ G at random. The roll of the
simulated die will be the product g1g2 · · · gp.
It follows from the G-invariance of the uniform measure that any p-subset of
(1) {g1, g2, ..., gp, g1g2 · · · gp}
is independent! Thus, this is a (p− 1)-robust simulation.
For an example of this construction, consider how Alice and Bob may robustly flip a coin
with bias 2/5. Alice picks an element a ∈ Z/5Z, and Bob picks an element b ∈ Z/5Z; both
do so using the uniform distribution. Then, a, b, and a + b are pairwise independent! We
say that the coin came up heads if a+ b ∈ {0, 1} and tails if a+ b ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
This construction exploits the fact that several random variables may be pairwise (or
(p− 1)-setwise) independent but still dependent overall. In cryptology, this approach goes
back to the one-time pad. Shamir [Sha79] uses it to develop secret-sharing protocols,
and these are exploited in multiparty computation to such ends as playing poker without
cards [GM82,GMW87].
Corollary 3. If p players are equipped with private, full-strength finite Q-random sources,
they may (p− 1)-robustly simulate a private, full-strength finite Q-random source for some
other player.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 because any finite rational probability space is a quotient
of some finite uniform distribution.
2.1 Cooperative numbers
We define a useful class of numbers.
Definition 4. If p people with private full-strength finite random sources can robustly sim-
ulate a coin flip with bias α, we say α is p-cooperative. We denote the set of p-cooperative
numbers by C(p).
The ability to robustly simulate coin flips of certain bias is enough to robustly simulate any
finite spaces with points having those biases, assuming some hypotheses about C(p) which
we will later see to be true.
Lemma 5. Suppose that, if α, α′ ∈ C(p) and α < α′, then α/α′ ∈ C(p). If p people have
full-strength finite random sources, they can robustly simulate precisely finite C(p)-random
sources.
Proof. Clearly, any random source they simulate must take p-cooperative probabilities,
because any space with a subset of mass α has the space (α 1− α) as a quotient.
In the other direction, consider a finite probability space with point masses
(2) ( α1 α2 · · · αn )
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in C(p). Robustly flip a coin of bias α1. In the heads case, we pick the first point. In the
tails case, we apply induction to robustly simulate
(3) ( α2/(1− α1) · · · αn/(1− α1) ).
This is possible because 1 − α1 ∈ C(p) by symmetry, and so the ratios αi/(1 − α1) ∈ C(p)
by assumption.
2.2 Restatement using multilinear algebra
Consider a {heads, tails}-valued function of several independent finite probability spaces
that produces an α-biased coin flip when random sources sample the spaces. If we model
each probability space as a stochastic vector—that is, a nonnegative vector whose coordi-
nates sum to one—we may view the product probability space as the Kronecker product
of these vectors. Each entry in the resulting tensor represents the probability of a certain
combination of outputs from the random sources. Since the sources together determine the
flip, some of these entries should be marked “heads,” and the rest “tails.”
For instance, if we have a fair die and a fair coin at our disposal, we may cook up some
rule to assign “heads” or “tails” to each combination of results:
(4)

1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6

⊗ ( 12 12 ) =

1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12

−→

H T
H T
T H
H T
T H
T H

If we want to calculate the probability of heads, we can substitute 1 for H and 0 for T in
the last matrix and evaluate
(5)
(
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
)

1 0
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 1

(
1
2
1
2
)
=
1
2
.
This framework gives an easy way to check if the algorithm is robust in the sense of Yao. If
one of the random sources is miscalibrated (maybe the die is a little uneven), we may see
what happens to the probability of heads:
(6)
(
1
12
1
10
1
6
1
4
1
15
1
3
)

1 0
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 1

(
1
2
1
2
)
=
1
2
.
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It’s unaffected! In fact, defining
(7) A
(
x(1), x(2)
)
= x(1)

1 0
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 1
x
(2)>,
we see that letting β(1) =
(
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
)
and β(2) =
(
1
2
1
2
)
gives us
A
(
x(1), β(2)
)
=
1
2
A
(
β(1), x(2)
)
=
1
2
(8)
for all x(1) and x(2) of mass one. These relations express Yao’s notion of robustness; in-
deed, changing at most one of the distributions to some other distribution leaves the result
unaltered. As long as no two of the sources are miscalibrated, the bit is generated with
probability 1/2.
If α denotes the bias of the bit, we may write the robustness condition as
A
(
x(1), β(2)
)
= αJ
(
x(1), β(2)
)
A
(
β(1), x(2)
)
= αJ
(
β(1), x(2)
)
(9)
since the β(i) both have mass one. (Here as always, J stands for the all-ones tensor of
appropriate dimensions.) These new equations hold for all x(i), by linearity. Subtracting,
we obtain
0 = (αJ −A)
(
x(1), β(2)
)
0 = (αJ −A)
(
β(1), x(2)
)
(10)
which says exactly that the bilinear form (αJ −A) is degenerate, i.e., that
(11) Det(αJ −A) = 0.6
These conditions seem familiar: Changing the all-ones matrix J to the identity matrix I
would make α an eigenvalue for the left and right eigenvectors β(i). By analogy, we call
α a mystery-value of the matrix A and the vectors β(i) mystery-vectors. Here’s the full
definition:
Definition 6. A p-linear form A is said to have mystery-value α and corresponding
mystery-vectors β(i) when, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
(12) 0 = (αJ −A)
(
β(1), . . . , β(j−1), x(j), β(j+1), . . . , β(p)
)
for all vectors x(j).
We further require that J(β(i)) 6= 0.
6If the matrix (αJ−A) is not square, this equality should assert that all determinants of maximal square
submatrices vanish.
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We will see later that these conditions on (αJ −A) extend the notion of degeneracy
to multilinear forms in general. This extension is captured by a generalization of the
determinant—the hyperdeterminant.7 Hyperdeterminants will give meaning to the state-
ment Det(αJ −A) = 0, even when A is not bilinear.
This organizational theorem summarizes our efforts to restate the problem using mul-
tilinear algebra.
Theorem 7. A function from the product of several finite probability spaces to the set
{H,T} generates an α-biased bit robustly iff the corresponding multilinear form has mystery-
value α with the probability spaces as the accompanying mystery-vectors.
We may now show the equivalence of robustness and privacy more formally. Privacy requires
that (αJ − A) (⊗β(i)) remains zero, even if one of the distributions in the tensor product
collapses to some point mass, that is, to some basis vector.8 This condition must hold for
all basis vectors, so it extends by linearity to Yao’s robustness.
2.3 Two players
The case p = 2 leaves us in the familiar setting of bilinear forms.
Proposition 8 (Uniqueness). Every bilinear form has at most one mystery-value.
Proof. Suppose α and α′ are both mystery-values for the matrix A with mystery-vectors
β(i) and β(i)
′
, respectively. We have four equations at our disposal, but we will only use
two:
A
(
x(1) , β(2)
)
= α
A
(
β(1)
′
, x(2)
)
= α′(13)
We observe that a compromise simplifies both ways:
(14) α = A
(
β(1)
′
, β(2)
)
= α′,
so any two mystery-values are equal.
Corollary 9. Two players may not simulate an irrationally-biased coin.
Proof. Say the {0, 1}-matrixA has mystery-value α. Any field automorphism σ ∈ Gal(C/Q)
respects all operations of linear algebra, so σ(α) is a mystery-value of the matrix σ(A). But
the entries of A are all rational, so σ(A) = A. Indeed, σ(α) must also be a mystery-value
of A itself. By the uniqueness proposition, σ(α) = α. Thus, α is in the fixed field of every
automorphism over Q and cannot be irrational.
7Hyperdeterminants were first introduced in the 2 × 2 × 2 case by Cayley [Cay45], and were defined in
full generality and studied by Gelfand, Kapranov, and Zelevinsky [GKZ94, Chapter 14].
8That is, the simulated bit remains a “mystery” to each player, even though she can see the output of
her own random source.
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Theorem 10. C(2) = Q∩[0, 1]. Two people with finite random sources can robustly simulate
only Q-random sources; indeed, they can already simulate a full-strength finite Q-random
source if they have full-strength finite Q-random sources.
Proof. The previous corollary shows that no probability generated by the source can be
irrational, since it could be used to simulate an irrationally-biased coin. The other direction
has already been shown in Corollary 3.
Proposition 11. If p people have full-strength finite Q-random sources, they may (p− 1)-
robustly simulate any finite Q-random source.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 just as the constructive direction of Theorem 10 does.
2.4 Three or more players: what can’t be done
Even if three or more players have private finite random sources, it remains impossible
to robustly simulate a transcendentally-biased coin. The proof makes use of algebraic
geometry, especially the concept of the dual of a complex projective variety. We describe
these ideas briefly in Appendix A. For a more thorough introduction, see [Har92, Lec. 14,
15, 16] or [GKZ94, Ch. 1].
Let A be a rational multilinear functional of format n1×· · ·×np (see Section A.2), and
let X be the Segre variety of the same format. Set n := n1 · · ·np − 1, the dimension of the
ambient projective space where X lives. In what follows, we prove that A has algebraic
mystery-values. This is trivial when A is a multiple of J , and for convenience we exclude
that case.
Proposition 12. Let A have mystery-value α with corresponding mystery-vectors β(i).
Define β = ⊗β(i), and let B denote the hyperplane of elements of (Pn)∗ that yield zero
when applied to β. Now (B, (αJ −A)) is in the incidence variety WX∨ (see Section A.1).
Proof. By the biduality theorem 31, the result would follow from the statement,
(15) “The hyperplane {x : (αJ −A)(x) = 0} is tangent to X at β.”
But this statement is true by the partial derivatives formulation (Definition 32) of the
degeneracy of (αJ −A).
It is a standard fact (see e.g. [Mum95, p. 6]) that any variety has a stratification into
locally closed smooth sets. The first stratum of X∨ is the Zariski-open set of smooth points
of the variety. This leaves a subvariety of strictly smaller dimension, and the procedure
continues inductively. Equations for the next stratum may be found by taking derivatives
and determinants.
Since X∨ itself is defined over Q, it follows that each of its strata is as well. We conclude
that there must be some subvariety S ⊆ X∨, defined over Q, that contains (αJ −A) as a
smooth point.
Theorem 13. Any mystery-value of A must be an algebraic number.
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Proof. Let A′ = αJ − A, and let ` be the unique projective line through A and J . Let A
be some open affine in (Pn)∗ containing A′ and J . The hyperplane B ∩A is the zero locus
of some degree one regular function f on A. On ` ∩ A, this function will be nonzero at J
(since J(β) 6= 0), so f is linear and not identically zero. It follows that f(A) = 0 is the
unique zero of f on `, occurring with multiplicity one. Thus, the restriction of f to the
local ring of ` at A′ is in the maximal ideal but not its square:
(16) f 6= 0 ∈ m`/m2` = T ∗A′(`) where m` denotes the maximal ideal in O`,A′ .
On the other hand, Proposition 12 shows that (B, A′) ∈ WX∨ . Consequently, B must be
tangent to S, that is, f restricted to S is in the square of the maximal ideal of the local
ring of S at A′:
(17) f = 0 ∈ mS/m2S = T ∗A′(S) where mS denotes the maximal ideal in OS,A′ .
The function f must be zero in the cotangent space of the intersection S ∩ ` since the
inclusion S ∩ ` ↪→ S induces a surjection
(18) T ∗A′(S) T ∗A′(S ∩ `),
so the corresponding surjection
(19) T ∗A′(`) T ∗A′(S ∩ `)
must kill f . This first space is the cotangent space of a line, hence one dimensional. But
f is nonzero in the first space, so the second space must be zero. It follows that S ∩ ` is a
zero dimensional variety.
Of course, [α : 1] lies in S ∩ `, which is defined over Q! The number α must be
algebraic.
Therefore, the set of p-cooperative numbers is contained inQ∩[0, 1], and we have established
the following proposition:
Proposition 14. If several people with finite random sources simulate a private random
source for someone else, that source must take probabilities in Q.
2.5 Three players: what can be done
We prove that three players with private full-strength finite random sources are enough to
simulate any private finite Q-random source. First, we give a construction for a hypermatrix
with stochastic mystery-vectors for a given algebraic number α, but whose entries may be
negative. Next, we use it to find a nonnegative hypermatrix with mystery-value (α+ r)/s
for some suitable natural numbers r and s. Then, after a bit of convex geometry to “even
out” this hypermatrix, we scale and shift it back, completing the construction.
Remark 15. Our construction may easily be made algorithmic, but in practice it gives
hypermatrices that are far larger than optimal. An optimal algorithm would need to be
radically different to take full advantage of the third person. The heart of our construction
(see Proposition 18) utilizes 2 × (n + 1) × (n + 1) hypermatrices, but the degree of the
hyperdeterminant polynomial grows much more quickly for (near-)diagonal formats [GKZ94,
Ch. 14]. We would be excited to see a method of producing (say) small cubic hypermatrices
with particular mystery-values.
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2.5.1 Hypermatrices with cooperative entries
Recall that a {heads, tails}-function of several finite probability spaces may be represented
by a {1, 0}-hypermatrix. The condition that the entries of the matrix are either 1 or 0 is
inconvenient when we want to build simulations for a given algebraic bias. Fortunately,
constructing a matrix with cooperative entries will suffice.
Lemma 16. Suppose that A is a p-dimensional hypermatrix with p-cooperative entries
in [0, 1] and stochastic mystery-vectors β(1), . . . , β(p) for the mystery-value α. Then, α is
p-cooperative.
Proof. Let the hypermatrix A have entries w1, w2, . . . , wn. Each entry wk is p-cooperative,
so it is the mystery-value of some p-dimensional {0, 1}-hypermatrix Ak with associated
stochastic mystery-vectors β
(1)
k , β
(2)
k , . . . , β
(p)
k . We now build a {0, 1}-hypermatrix A′ with
α as a mystery-value. The hypermatrix A′ has blocks corresponding to the entries of A.
We replace each entry wi of A with a Kronecker product:
(20) wi becomes J1 ⊗ J2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ji−1 ⊗Ai ⊗ Ji+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Jn.
It is easy to check that the resulting tensor A′ has α as a mystery-value with corresponding
mystery-vectors β(i) ⊗ β(i)1 ⊗ β(i)2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ β(i)n .
Because rational numbers are 2-cooperative, this lemma applies in particular to rational
p-dimensional hypermatrices, for p ≥ 2. In this case and in others, the construction can be
modified to give an A′ of smaller format.
Readers who have been following the analogy between mystery-values and eigenval-
ues will see that Lemma 16 corresponds to an analogous result for eigenvalues of matrices.
Nonetheless, there are striking differences between the theories of mystery-values and eigen-
values. For instance, we are in the midst of showing that it is always possible to construct
a nonnegative rational hypermatrix with a given nonnegative algebraic mystery-value and
stochastic mystery-vectors. The analogous statement for matrix eigenvalues is false, by
the Perron-Frobenius theorem: any such algebraic number must be greater than or equal
to all of its Galois conjugates (which will also occur as eigenvalues). Encouragingly, the
inverse problem for eigenvalues has been solved: Every “Perron number” may be realized
as a “Perron eigenvalue” [Lin84]. Our solution to the corresponding inverse problem for
mystery-values uses different techniques. It would be nice to see if either proof sheds light
on the other.
2.5.2 Constructing hypermatrices from matrices
Proposition 17. If λ is a real algebraic number of degree n, then there is some M ∈ Mn(Q)
having λ as an eigenvalue with non-perpendicular positive left and right eigenvectors.
Proof. Let f ∈ Q[x] be the minimal polynomial for λ over Q, and let L be the companion
matrix for f . That is, if
(21) f(x) = xn +
n−1∑
k=0
akx
k for ak ∈ Q,
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then
(22) L =

0 0 · · · 0 −a0
1 0 · · · 0 −a1
0 1 · · · 0 −a2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 −an−1
 .
The polynomial f is irreducible over Q, so it has no repeated roots in C. The matrix L
is therefore diagonalizable, with diagonal entries the roots of f . Fix a basis for which L is
diagonal, with λ in the upper-left entry. In this basis, the right and left eigenvectors, v0 and
w0, corresponding to λ are zero except in the first coordinate. It follows that v0(w0) 6= 0.
The right and left eigenvectors may now be visualized as two geometric objects: a real
hyperplane and a real vector not contained in it. It’s clear that GLn(R) acts transitively
on the space S := {(v, w) ∈ (Rn)∗ × Rn : v(w) = v0(w0)}. Moreover, GLn(Q) is dense
in GLn(R), so the orbit of (v0, w0) under the action of GLn(Q) is dense in S. The set of
positive pairs in S is non-empty and open, so we may rationally conjugate L to a basis
which makes v0 and w0 positive.
Proposition 18. If λ is real algebraic, then there exist integers r ≥ 0, s > 0 such that
(λ+ r)/s ∈ C(3).
Proof. By Proposition 17, there is a rational n×nmatrixM with non-perpendicular positive
right and left eigenvectors v, w for the eigenvalue λ. Rescale w so that v(w) = 1, and choose
an integer q ≥ max {J(v), J(w)}. Define the block 2× (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) hypermatrix
(23) A :=

0 0 · · · 0
0
... q2M
0
1 1 · · · 1
1
... q2(M − I) + J
1
 ,
where I and J are the n × n identity and all-ones matrices, respectively. Consider A as
a trilinear form, where the metacolumns correspond to the coordinates of the first vector,
the rows the second, and the columns the third. Define the block vectors
(24)
β(1) = ( 1− λ λ ) ,
β(2) = ( 1− J(v)/q | v1/q v2/q · · · vn/q ) , and
β(3) = ( 1− J(w)/q | w1/q w2/q · · · wn/q ) .
Clearly, these are all probability vectors. It’s easy to verify that
A
(
x(1), β(2), β(3)
)
= λJ
(
x(1)
)
,
A
(
β(1), x(2), β(3)
)
= λJ
(
x(2)
)
, and
A
(
β(1), β(2), x(3)
)
= λJ
(
x(3)
)
.(25)
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Choose a nonnegative integer r large enough so that all the entries of A+ rJ are positive,
and then a positive integer s so that all the entries of A′ := (A+ rJ)/s are between 0 and
1.
A′
(
x(1), β(2), β(3)
)
=
λ+ r
s
J
(
x(1)
)
,
A′
(
β(1), x(2), β(3)
)
=
λ+ r
s
J
(
x(2)
)
, and
A′
(
β(1), β(2), x(3)
)
=
λ+ r
s
J
(
x(3)
)
.(26)
By Lemma 16, it follows that (λ+ r)/s is 3-cooperative.
2.5.3 Finishing the Proof
The following lemma, which we we prove later, enables us to complete the goal of this
section: to classify which private random sources three or more people can simulate.
Lemma 19 (Approximation lemma). Let α be a p-cooperative number. Now for any ε > 0
there exists a p-dimensional rational hypermatrix whose entries are all within ε of α, having
α as a mystery-value with stochastic mystery-vectors.
Theorem 20. C(p) = Q ∩ [0, 1] for each p ≥ 3.
Proof. Certainly 0 and 1 are 3-cooperative. Let α be an algebraic number in (0, 1). By
Proposition 18, there are integers r ≥ 0, s > 0 so that (α + r)/s is 3-cooperative. Let
ε := (min{α, 1− α}) /s.
By Proposition 19, there is some three-dimensional rational hypermatrix A whose entries
are all within ε of (α+ r)/s, having (α+ r)/s as a mystery-value with stochastic mystery-
vectors. Then, sA − rJ is a three-dimensional rational hypermatrix with entries between
0 and 1, having α as a mystery-value with stochastic mystery-vectors. By Lemma 16, α is
3-cooperative.
We already showed that all cooperative numbers are algebraic. Thus, for p ≥ 3,
(27) Q ∩ [0, 1] ⊆ C(3) ⊆ C(p) ⊆ Q ∩ [0, 1],
so C(p) = Q ∩ [0, 1].
In conclusion, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 21. Three or more people with finite random sources can robustly simulate only
Q-random sources. Indeed, if they have full-strength finite Q-random sources, they can
already robustly simulate a full-strength finite Q-random source.
2.5.4 Proof of the approximation lemma
The proof that follows is a somewhat lengthy “delta-epsilon” argument broken down into
several smaller steps. As we believe our construction of a hypermatrix with mystery-value
α to be far from optimal, we strive for ease of exposition rather than focusing on achieving
tight bounds at each step along the way.
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Recall that a finite probability space may be usefully modeled by a positive9 vector of
mass one. Let β be such a vector. We denote by #β the number of coordinates of β . We
say β′ is a refinement of β when β is the image of a measure-preserving map from β′; that
is, when the coordinates of β′ may be obtained by splitting up the coordinates of β.
The following easy lemma states that any positive vector of unit mass can be refined in
such a way that all the coordinates are about the same size.
Lemma 22 (Refinement lemma). Let β be a positive vector of total mass 1. For any δ > 0
there exists a refinement β′ of β with the property that
(28) min
j
β′j ≥
1− δ
#β′
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that β1 is the smallest coordinate of β. Let
γ = β1δ, and let k = #β. The vector β is in the standard open k-simplex
(29) ∆k = {positive vectors of mass 1 and dimension k}.
The rational points in ∆k are dense (as in any rational polytope), and
(30) U := {x ∈ ∆k : (∀i) |βi − xi| < γ and β1 < x1}
is an open subset of the simplex. So U contain a rational point
(
n1
n , . . . ,
nk
n
)
, with n =
∑
ni.
Thus,
∣∣βi − nin ∣∣ < γ and β1 < n1n , so
(31)
∣∣∣∣βini − 1n
∣∣∣∣ < γni ≤ γn1 < γβjn = δn.
Let β′ be the refinement of β obtained by splitting up βi into ni equal-sized pieces. We
have #β′ = n, and the claim follows from this last inequality.
Remark 23. The best general bounds on the smallest possible #β′ given β and δ are not
generally known, but fairly good bounds may be obtained from the multidimensional version
of Dirichlet’s theorem on rational approximation, which is classical and elementary [Dav54].
Actually calculating good simultaneous rational approximations is a difficult problem, and
one wishing to make an algorithmic version of our construction should consult the literature
on multidimensional continued fractions and Farey partitions, for example, [Lag82, NS06].
The next proposition is rather geometrical. It concerns the n×n matrix Sδ := (1−δ)(J/n)+
δI, which is a convex combination of two maps on the standard simplex: the averaging map
and the identity map. Each vertex gets mapped almost to the center, so the action of Sδ can
be visualized as shrinking the standard simplex around its center point. The proposition
picks up where the refinement lemma left off:
Proposition 24. If a stochastic vector β satisfies
(32) min
i
βi ≥ 1− δ
#β
then its image under the map S−1δ is still stochastic.
9We may leave out points of mass zero.
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Proof. First note that [(1− δ) (J/#β) + δI] [(1− 1/δ) (J/#β) + (1/δ)I] = I, so we have
an explicit form for S−1δ . We know that mini βi ≥ (1− δ)/#β, so the vector
(33) E =
1
δ
[
β −
(
1− δ
#β
)
J
]
is still positive. Now β = (1−δ) (J/#β)+δE, a convex combination of two positive vectors.
The vector β has mass 1, and (J/#β) as well, so E also has mass 1.
Now compute:
S−1δ β =
[
(1− 1/δ) (J/#β) + (1/δ)I
][
(1− δ) (J/#β) + δE
]
=
[
(1− 1/δ)(1− δ) + (1/δ)(1− δ) + (1− 1/δ)δ
]
(J/#β) + E
= E.(34)
This completes the proof.
The following proposition shows that applying the matrix Sδ in all arguments of some
multilinear functional forces the outputs to be close to each other.
Proposition 25. Let A be a hypermatrix of format n1×n2×· · ·×np with entries in [0, 1],
and take δ := ε/(2p). Now the matrix A′ defined by
(35) A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
:= A
(
⊗Sδx(i)
)
satisfies |A′(x)−A′(x′)| ≤ ε for any two stochastic tensors x and x′.
Proof. Let m := A (⊗(J/ni)), the mean of the entries of A. We show that for any stochastic
vectors x(i),
(36)
∣∣∣A′ (⊗x(i))−m∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2.
Since any other stochastic tensor is a convex combination of stochastic pure tensors, it will
follow that |A′(x)−m| ≤ ε/2. Then the triangle inequality will yield the result.
It remains to show that A′ applied to a stochastic pure tensor gives a value within ε/2
of m.
A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
= A
(
⊗Sδx(i)
)
= A
(
⊗ [(1− δ)(J/ni) + δI]x(i)
)
= A
(
⊗
[
(1− δ)(J/ni) + δx(i)
])
.(37)
Each argument of A—that is, factor in the tensor product—is a convex combination of two
stochastic vectors. Expanding out by multilinearity, we get convex combination with 2p
points. Each point—let’s call the kth one yk—is an element of [0, 1] since it is some weighted
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average of the entries of A. This convex combination has positive µk such that
∑
µk = 1
and
(38) A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
=
2p∑
k=1
µkyk.
Taking the first vector in each argument of A in (37), we see that y1 = A (⊗(J/ni)) = m,
the average entry of A. Thus, the first term in the convex combination is µ1y1 = (1−δ)pm.
The inequality (1−ε/2) ≤ (1−δ)p allows us to split up the first term. Let µ0 := 1−ε/2
and µ′1 := µ1 − µ0 ≥ 0. We have µ1y1 = (µ0 + µ′1)y1 = (1− ε/2)m + µ′1m. After splitting
this term, the original convex combination becomes
(39) A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
= (1− ε/2)m+ µ′1m+
2p∑
k=2
µkyk.
Let e denote the weighted average of the terms after the first. We may rewrite the convex
combination
(40) A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
= (1− ε/2)m+ (ε/2)e.
Since m, e ∈ [0, 1],
(41) m− ε/2 ≤ (1− ε/2)m ≤ A′
(
⊗x(i)
)
≤ (1− ε/2)m+ ε/2 ≤ m+ ε/2,
and
(42)
∣∣∣A′ (⊗x(i))−m∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2,
so we are done.
These results are now strong enough to prove the approximation lemma 19.
Proof. The number α is p-cooperative, so it comes with some p-dimensional nonnegative
rational hypermatrix A and positive vectors β(1), β(2), . . . , β(p) of mass one, satisfying (in
particular) A
(⊗β(i)) = α. The refinement lemma allows us to assume that each β(i) satisfies
(43) min
j
β
(i)
j ≥
1− δ
#β(i)
.
If one of the β(i) fails to satisfy this hypothesis, we may replace it with the refinement given
by the lemma, and duplicate the corresponding slices in A to match.
Now, by Proposition 24, each S−1δ β
(i) is a stochastic vector.
Let A′ be as in Proposition 25. It will still be a rational hypermatrix if we pick ε to be
rational. We know
(44) A′
(
⊗S−1δ β(i)
)
= α.
On the other hand, any entry of the matrix A′ is given by evaluation at a tensor product
of basis vectors. Both α and any entry of A′ can be found by evaluating A′ at a stochastic
tensor. Thus, by Proposition 25, each entry of A′ is within ε of α.
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2.6 Higher-order robustness
We complete the proof of our main theorem.
Proposition 26. If r ≥ p/2, then p people with finite random sources may r-robustly
simulate only finite Q-random sources.
Proof. Consider an r-robust simulation. Imagine that Alice has access to half of the random
sources (say, rounded up), and Bob has access to the remaining sources. Because Alice and
Bob have access to no more than r random sources, neither knows anything about the
source being simulated. But this is precisely the two-player case of ordinary 1-robustness,
so the source being simulated is restricted to rational probabilities.
In the constructive direction, we show the following:
Proposition 27. If r < p/2, then p people with full-strength finite Q-random sources may
r-robustly simulate a full-strength finite Q-random source.
The proof is to simulate simulations (and simulate simulations of simulations, etc.). We
treat the p = 3 case of our 1-robust simulation protocol as a black box. If a majority of
the random sources put into it are reliable, the one that comes out (the simulated random
source) will also be reliable. This viewpoint leads us into a discussion of majority gates.
Definition 28. A p-ary majority gate is a logic gate that computes a boolean function
returning 1 if a majority of its inputs are 1 and 0 if a majority of its inputs are 0. (The
output doesn’t matter when there are ties.)
Lemma 29 (Bureaucracy). A p-ary majority gate may be built by wiring together ternary
majority gates.
The proof of the bureaucracy lemma is a straightforward application of the probabilistic
method, and is covered in detail in Appendix B. Now, by iterating simulations of simulations
according to the wiring provided by the bureaucracy lemma, we can overcome any minority
of malfunctioning sources. So the bureaucracy lemma, together with the “black box” of
our three-player construction, implies Proposition 27.
Now we’re finally ready to prove our main result. The statement here is equivalent to
the ones in the abstract and in Section 1.2 but uses the language of robustness.
Theorem 30. Say p people have full-strength finite random sources. If p/2 ≤ r < p, the
people may r-robustly simulate any finite Q-random source and nothing better; if 1 ≤ r <
p/2, they may r-robustly simulate any finite Q-random source and nothing better.
Proof. The claim simply combines Proposition 11, Proposition 26, Theorem 30, and Propo-
sition 27.
3 Application to Secure Multiparty Computation and Men-
tal Poker
We begin with the classical case: Three gentlemen wish to play poker, but they live far
away from each other, so playing with actual cards is out of the question. They could
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play online poker, in which another party (the remotely hosted poker program) acts as a
dealer and moderator, keeping track of the cards in each player’s hand, in the deck, etc.,
and giving each player exactly the information he would receive in a physical game. But
this solution require our gentlemen to trust the moderator! If they fear the moderator may
favor one of them, or if they wish to keep their game and its outcome private, they need
another system.
A better solution is to use secure multiparty computation. Our gentlemen work to
simulate a moderator in a way that keeps the outcomes of the moderator’s computations
completely hidden from each of them. An unconditionally-secure method of playing poker
(and running other games/computations) “over the phone” has been described in [GM82].
In the classical case, the players may perform finite computations, communicate along
private channels, and query full-strength finitary private random sources. The simulated
moderator has the almost same abilities as the players, except that its private random source
is limited to rational probabilities. The work of this paper expands this to all algebraic
probabilities, and shows that one can do no better.
To see how this may be useful, think back to our poker players. They may be preparing
for a poker tournament, and they may want to simulate opponents who employ certain bet-
ting strategies. But poker is a complicated multiplayer game (in the sense of economic game
theory), and Nash equilibria will occur at mixed strategies with algebraic coefficients.10
A Relevant Constructions in Algebraic Geometry
Comprehensive introductions to these constructions may be found in [Har92, Lec. 14, 15,
16] and [GKZ94, Ch. 1].
A.1 Tangency and projective duality
Let k be an algebraically closed field of characteristic zero. (For our purposes, it would
suffice to take k = C, but the methods are completely general.) Let X ⊆ Pn be a projective
variety over k. A hyperplane H ∈ (Pn)∗ is (algebraically) tangent to X at a point z if every
regular function on an affine neighborhood of z vanishing on H lies in the square of the
maximal ideal of the local ring OX,z.
This notion of tangency agrees with geometric intuition on the set of smooth points
Xsm of X. To get a more complete geometric picture, we define an incidence variety:
(45) WX := {(z,H) : z ∈ Xsm, H is tangent to X at z} ⊆ Pn × (Pn)∗.
The bar denotes Zariski closure. Membership in WX may be thought of as extending the
notion of tangency at a smooth point to include singular points “by continuity.”
The image of a projective variety under a regular map is Zariski closed, so the projection
of WX onto the second coordinate is a variety, called the dual variety and denoted X
∨.
The following theorem explains why projective duality is called “duality.” We omit the
proof; see [Har92, p. 208–209] or [GKZ94, p. 27–30].
10The appearance of algebraic (but not transcendental) coefficients in mixed strategies is explained by R.
J. Lipton and E. Markakis here [LM04].
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Theorem 31 (Biduality theorem). Let X be a variety in Pn. For z ∈ Pn, let z∗∗ be
the image under the natural isomorphism to (Pn)∗∗. Then, (z,H) 7→ (H, z∗∗) defines an
isomorphism WX ∼= WX∨. (Specializing to the case when (z,H) and (H, z∗∗ are smooth
points X and X∨, respectively, this says that H is tangent to X at z if and only if z is
tangent to X∨ at H.) Moreover, z 7→ z∗∗ defines an isomorphism X ∼= (X∨)∨.
A.2 Segre embeddings and their duals
Consider the natural map kn1 × · · · × knp → kn1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ knp = kn1···np given by the tensor
product. Under this map, the fiber of a line through the origin is a tuple of lines through
the origin. Thus, this map induces an embedding Pn1−1 × · · · × Pnp−1 ↪→ Pn1···np−1. The
map is known as the Segre embedding, and the image is known as the Segre variety X of
format n1×· · ·×np. It is, in other words, the pure tensors considered as a subvariety of all
tensors, up to constant multiples. This variety is cut out by the determinants of the 2× 2
subblocks. Also, it is smooth because it is isomorphic as a variety to Pn1−1 × · · · × Pnp−1.
When a projective variety is defined over the rational numbers,11 its dual is also defined
over the rationals, by construction [GKZ94, p. 14]. In particular, the dual X∨ of the Segre
embedding is defined over Q.
When the dimensions ni satisfy the “p-gon inequality”
(46) (nj − 1) ≤
∑
i 6=j
(ni − 1),
Gelfand, Kapranov, and Zelevinsky [GKZ94, p. 446] show that the dual of the Segre
variety is a hypersurface. The polynomial for this hypersurface is irreducible, has integer
coefficients, and is known as the hyperdeterminant of format n1× · · ·×np. It is denoted by
Det. When p = 2 and n1 = n2, the hyperdeterminant is the same as the determinant of a
square matrix [GKZ94, p. 36].
Gelfand, Kapranov, and Zelevinsky provide us with two equivalent definitions of degen-
eracy.
Definition 32. A p-linear form T is said to be degenerate if either of the following
equivalent conditions holds:
• there exist nonzero vectors β(i) so that, for any 0 ≤ j ≤ p,
(47) T
(
β(1), . . . , β(j−1), x(j), β(j+1), . . . , β(p)
)
= 0 for all x(j);
• there exist nonzero vectors β(i) so that T vanishes at ⊗β(i) along with every partial
derivative with respect to an entry of some β(i):
(48) T and
∂T
∂β
(i)
j
vanish at ⊗β(i).
The dual of the Segre variety is useful to us because it can tell whether a multilinear form
is degenerate.
11That is, it is the zero set of a system of homogeneous rational polynomials.
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Theorem 33 (Gelfand, Kapranov, and Zelevinsky). For any format, the dual X∨ of the
Segre embedding is defined over Q and satisfies, for every multilinear form T of that format,
(49) T ∈ X∨ ⇐⇒ T is degenerate.
When the format satisfies the “p-gon inequality,” X∨ is defined by a polynomial in the
entries of T with coefficients in Z, called the hyperdeterminant:
(50) Det(T ) = 0 ⇐⇒ T is degenerate.
B Proof of the bureaucracy lemma
Here, we show that a p-ary majority gate may be built out of ternary majority gates.
Proof. We prove the existence of the majority gate by showing that a random gate built in
a certain way has a positive probability of being a majority gate. For simplicity, we assume
p is odd. The even case follows from the odd case: A (2k − 1)-ary majority gate functions
as a (2k)-ary majority gate if we simply ignore one of the inputs.
Make a balanced ternary tree of depth n out of 30 + 31 + · · · + 3n−1 ternary majority
gates, where n is to be specified later. Let S be the set of possible assignments of p colors
(one for each input slot) to the 3n leaves of the tree. Each s ∈ S defines a p-ary gate; we
prove that, for n large enough, a positive fraction of these are majority gates. Let T be the
set of p-tuples of input values with exactly p+12 coordinates equal to 1. For (s, t) ∈ S × T ,
let χ(s, t) be the bit returned by the gate defined by s on input t.
If each input of a 3-ary majority gate is chosen to be 1 with probability x, and 0 with
probability 1− x, we may compute the probability f(x) that the resulting bit is 1:
(51) f(x) =
(
3
2
)
x2(1− x) +
(
3
3
)
x3 = x2(3− 2x).
Fixing the choice of t ∈ T and letting s vary uniformly, it’s as if we’re assigning 1 or 0 to
each leaf with probabilities p+12 and
p−1
2 , respectively. We have
(52)
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
χ(s, t) = fn
(
p+ 1
2
)
,
where fn denotes iterated composition. Whenever 12 < ξ ≤ 1, it’s easy to see that fn(ξ)
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approaches 1 as n becomes large.12 Choose n so that fn
(
p+1
2
)
> 1− 1|T | . Now,
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
χ(s, t) =
∑
t∈T
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
χ(s, t)
=
∑
t∈T
fn
(
p+ 1
2
)
= |T |fn
(
p+ 1
2
)
> |T |
(
1− 1|T |
)
= |T | − 1.(53)
This is an average over S, and it follows that there must be some particular s0 ∈ S so that
the inner sum
∑
t∈T χ(s0, t) is greater than |T | − 1. But that sum clearly takes an integer
value between 0 and |T |, so it must take the value |T |, and we have χ(s0, t) = 1 for every
t ∈ T . That is, the gate specified by s0 returns 1 whenever exactly p+12 of the inputs are 1.
By construction, setting more inputs to 1 will not alter this outcome, so the gate returns 1
whenever a majority of the inputs are 1. By the symmetry between 1 and 0 in each ternary
component, the gate returns 0 whenever a majority of the inputs are 0. Thus, s0 defines a
p-ary majority gate.
We illustrate a 5-ary majority gate of the type obtained in the bureaucracy lemma:
3 2 5 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 5 1 3 5 3 5 2 4 1 1 1 5 1 2 4 4 5
C Simulating infinite random sources
Say Alice and Bob are both equipped with private, full-strength random sources; they wish
to simulate a private, full-strength random source for some other player.
For technical reasons, we will take “full-strength random source” to mean “a random
source capable of sampling from any Haar measure.” This restriction is mostly to avoid
venturing into the wilds of set theory. After all, the pathologies available to probability
12In fact, the convergence is very fast. While we’re ignoring computational complexity questions in this
paper, more careful bookkeeping shows that this proof gives a polynomial bound (in p) on the size of the
tree.
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spaces closely reflect the chosen set-theoretic axioms. We call these restricted spaces “Haar
spaces.”
Definition 34. A probability space P is a Haar space if there exists some compact topo-
logical group G, equipped with its normalized Haar measure, admitting a measure-preserving
map to P .
Remark 35. The following probability spaces are all Haar spaces: any continuous dis-
tribution on the real line; any standard probability space in the sense of Rokhlin [Rok49];
any Borel space or Borel measure on a Polish space; any finite probability space; arbitrary
products of the above.
The following construction is an easy generalization of the classical construction given in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 36. Let G be a compact group with normalized Haar measure. Now, p players
equipped with private sources that sample from G may (p − 1)-robustly simulate an source
that samples from G.
Proof. We provide a direct construction. The ith player uses the Haar measure to pick
gi ∈ G at random. The output of the simulated source will be the product g1g2 · · · gp.
It follows from the invariance of the Haar measure that any p-subset of
(54) {g1, g2, ..., gp, g1g2 · · · gp}
is independent! Thus, this is a (p− 1)-robust simulation.
Corollary 37. If p players are equipped with private, full-strength random sources, they
may (p−1)-robustly simulate may simulate a private, full-strength random source for some
other player.
Proof. By Proposition 36, they may simulate a private random source capable of sampling
from any compact group with Haar measure. But such a random source may also sample
from all quotients of such spaces.
Corollary 38. If p players are equipped with private random sources capable of sampling
from the unit interval, they may (p− 1)-robustly simulate a random source capable of sam-
pling from any standard probability space—in particular, any finite probability space.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 36.
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